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Divided consciousness
Divided consciousness is a term coined by Ernest Hilgard to define a psychological state in which one's consciousness is split into distinct components, possibly during hypnosis.
== Origin(s) ==
The theory of a division of consciousness was touched upon by Carl Jung in 1935 when he stated, "The so-called unity of consciousness is an illusion... we like to think that we are one but we are not."〔(Review: Dissociationism Revived, Matthew Hugh Erdelyi, Science, New Series, Vol. 200, No. 4342 (May 12, 1978), pp. 654-655; Published by: American Association for the Advancement of Science)〕 Ernest Hilgard believed that hypnosis causes a split in awareness and a vivid form of everyday mind splits.〔(Myers, David G. Psychology: Eighth Edition in Modules. New York, NY: Worth Publishers, 2007)〕 Drawing themes from Pierre Janet, Hilgard viewed hypnosis from this perspective as a willingness to divide the main systems of consciousness into different sectors. He argued that this split in consciousness can not only help define the state of mind reached during hypnosis, but can also help to define a vast range of psychological issues such as multiple personality disorder.
In Hilgard's ''Divided Consciousness Reconsidered'', he offers a great many examples of "dissociated" human behavior. With regard to theory, he does state that it is useful to assign two modes of consciousness, a receptive mode and an active mode—that is, a bimodal consciousness. In other places he mentions the concept of ''coconsciousness'', wherein two or more states of consciousness may be equally receptive or active, as, for example, in some types of multiple personality.〔Huebner, B. (1979). Distributing cognition: A defense of collective mentality,'' Journal of Psycholinguistic Research, 8 (6)'',591; Retrieved from http://www.springerlink.com/content/h66jn31642t052j8/fulltext.pdf?page=1〕
Many psychological studies assume a unity of consciousness. Doubt is cast on this assumption by psychophysical studies in normal subjects and those with blindsight showing the simultaneous dissociation of different modes of report of a sensation, and by clinical studies of anosognosic patients showing dissociations of awareness of their own states. These and other phenomena are interpreted to imply two kinds of division of consciousness: the separation of phenomenal experience from reflexive consciousness and the non-unity of reflexive consciousness. Reflexive consciousness is taken to be necessary for report and is associated with the self as the subject of experience and agent of report. Reflexive consciousness is operative only when we attend to our own states. When we are involved in the world reflexivity intervenes less and our consciousness is more unified.〔Hebb, D, Juzyck, P, Klein R.,(1983). The Nature of Thought, '' Medical Research Council, Applied Psychology Unit, Cambridge, UK.'' Retrieved from http://books.google.com/books?id=0cprqzSe6BkC&pg=PA34&lpg=PA34&dq=By+Donald+Olding+Hebb,+Peter+W.+Jusczyk,+Raymond+M.+Klein&source=bl&ots=N_f-8zNr2K&sig=dBHDyYyDKSCTQ4YohMjalD85fxY&hl=en&sa=X&oi=book_result&resnum=4&ct=result#PPA32,M1〕
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